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INTRODUCTION

I

n 2019, a report indicated that China was building a variant of the YJ-18
long-range cruise missile that can be fired from standard shipping containers
loaded on Chinese-flagged merchant vessels. 1 Given that China is the second-largest ship-owning nation in the world, controlling over 5,600 vessels
with a capacity of 270 million deadweight tonnage (dwt), 2 deploying container-launched missiles on its merchant fleet would significantly enhance
China’s warfighting capabilities. The State-owned China Ocean Shipping
Company (COSCO) is the world’s largest shipping company with over 800
merchant vessels (74.5 million dwt). 3 It is the world’s third-largest container
shipping company, operating 507 container vessels with a combined capacity
of 3.1 million twenty-foot equivalent units, which could be equipped with
these new lethal missile batteries. 4
The Chinese missile system is similar to the Russian Klub-K container
missile system. Once perfected, it will provide China with a long-range precision strike capability that can engage both surface combatants and landbased targets. Some of the advantages of the container-launched system include:
(1) The missiles are housed in a standard maritime shipping container, making them difficult to detect.
(2) The system can be designed to use containers of different loading capacities (e.g., 20- or 40-foot containers) depending on the mission.

1. China is Building Long-range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers, NAVY RECOG(Apr. 2019), https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/
2019/april/6971-china-is-building-long-range-cruise-missiles-launched-from-ship-containers.html.
2. Deadweight (dwt) is defined as the measure of the ship’s carrying capacity, taking
into consideration the weight of the cargo on board, fuel, ballast water, fresh water, crew,
and provisions for the crew, but excluding the weight of the ship.
3. China Has Become the World’s Second-largest Ship-Owning Nation, ISL, https://www.isl.
org/en/news/china-become-the-worlds-second-largest-ship-owning-nation (last visited
Aug. 11, 2021).
4. Biggest Shipping Companies: Top Ten by TEU Capacity, SHIP TECHNOLOGY (last updated
June 11, 2021), https://www.ship-technology.com/features/the-ten-biggest-shippingcompanies-in-2020/.
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(3) The loaded containers can be delivered using civilian logistics,
thereby avoiding attention.
(4) The missile system can be deployed from sea, rail, truck, or
ground platforms.
(5) The missiles can be launched autonomously using targeting data
from an external source.
The missile system can be equipped with active or passive target acquisition and designation systems that allow it to detect, identify, bear, and determine target coordinates at a distance exceeding the missile range. The system can also receive targeting data from coastal, shipborne, airborne, or satellite systems. 5
In 2016, China superseded its 1995 Regulation on National Defense
Transportation with a new law. The National Defense Transportation Law 6
clarifies the requirements of civil transportation resources to support military
operations “to improve the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] ability to leverage civilian carriers to support strategic projection.” 7 The new law also creates a “strategic projection support force” made up of large- and mediumsized Chinese shipping companies organized into “strategic projection support units,” responsible for providing “rapid, long-distance, and large-scale
national defense transportation support.” 8 National defense mobilization
standards are promulgated by the National Transportation War Readiness
Office, which is under the supervision of the Transport and Projection Bureau of the Central Military Committee (CMC) Logistic Support Department. Civilian carriers are under the command and control of the five Theater Commands and the Joint Logistics Support Force, a subordinate command of the CMC that supports the PLA for all general logistics requirements. 9 The law also requires that future Chinese commercial shipping be

5. Club-K, ROSOBORONEXPORT, http://roe.ru/esp/catalog/marina-de-guerra/armasde-la-nave/klab-k/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2021).
6. National Defense Transportation Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted
by the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress, Sept. 3, 2016, effective
Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764.
htm (unofficial English translation).
7. CONOR KENNEDY, CHINA MARITIME REPORT NO. 4: CIVIL TRANSPORT IN PLA
POWER PROJECTION 4 (2019), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar
ticle=1003&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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“designed, built and managed to support future military operations” during
times of war. 10
Some commercial vessels have already been modified and have participated in PLA Navy (PLAN) exercises. In 2020, naval engineers installed
a removable helicopter deck on a heavy-lift ship, converting it into a de facto
assault ship/expeditionary sea-base to support amphibious operations. 11 A
2021 report indicated that China is also converting roll-on roll-off (RORO)
passenger/car ferries to allow them to launch armed amphibious vehicles in
support of amphibious operations. 12 These vessels can carry up to 1,200 passengers and have a 2,740-foot vehicle lane capacity on their main and lower
decks, which equates to an amphibious mechanized infantry battalion. As
cross-strait tensions increase, raising the possibility of a conflict with Taiwan,
these converted RORO vessels will significantly enhance the PLAN’s amphibious capabilities. As a proof of concept, the converted 15,560-ton
RORO ferry Bang Chui Dao participated in a landing exercise with the PLAN
in the summer of 2020 on the coast of Guangdong Province. 13 This improvised fleet of converted merchant vessels could be used to provide additional
inexpensive lift capacity to support an invasion of Taiwan.
While none of these activities are illegal per se, they raise potential concerns under the law of naval warfare. These concerns are compounded given
China’s disregard for its international legal obligations under a number of
treaties, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), 14 the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), 15 and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
10. David Axe, Thousands Of Ships, Millions Of Troops: China Is Assembling a Huge Fleet for
War with Taiwan, FORBES (July 27, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/
07/27/thousands-of-ships-millions-of-troops-china-is-assembling-a-huge-assault-flotillafor-a-possible-attack-on-taiwan/?sh=36dd71d3751b.
11. David Axe, Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship into an Instant
Helicopter Carrier, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/
08/22/surprise-the-chinese-navy-just-transformed-this-cargo-ship-into-an-istant-helicopter-carrier/?sh=5d2515591d44.
12. Conor Kennedy, Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift,
The Jamestown Foundation (July 16, 2021), https://jamestown.org/program/ramping-thestrait-quick-and-dirty-solutions-to-boost-amphibious-lift/.
13. Id.
14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
15. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct.
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16.
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(SOLAS). 16 Using converted commercial ships in a military support role also
increases the risk that all Chinese-flagged merchant vessels in the area of
operations will be targeted as military objectives during an armed conflict
given that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between a converted and non-converted vessel, particularly container ships armed with
Klub-K missile batteries.
This article will briefly review the law applicable during an international
armed conflict (IAC) at sea. It will also discuss the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) requirements that apply to the conversion of merchant ships into
warships, as well as issues related to the inviolability of neutral merchant
ships during an IAC at sea. Finally, it will address the limited protections
afforded enemy civilian passenger vessels against destruction and the potential implications of using such vessels to actively support naval forces during
offensive operations.
II.

WARSHIPS AND BELLIGERENT RIGHTS

Only warships and military aircraft may exercise belligerent rights during an
IAC at sea. 17 These rights include, inter alia, the right to conduct offensive
attacks (kinetic or non-kinetic), the right of visit and search, the right of capture, the right to take reprisals, the right to control neutral vessels and aircraft
in the immediate vicinity of naval operations. Other vessels, such as naval
16. International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1974, Nov. 1, 1974, 32
U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2.
17. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907); Convention No. VII Relating to the Conversion of
Merchant Ships into Warships, Oct 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319 [hereinafter Hague VII];
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS art. 12 (1913), reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1123 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE]; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, NWIP 10-2, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE § 500e (1955), reprinted in ROBERT W.
TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 359, 394 (1955) (vol. 50, International Law Studies) [hereinafter NWIP 10-2]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.2.1 (2017) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 13.3.2 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR
MANUAL]; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Germany), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN MANUAL].
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auxiliaries and merchant vessels, even when carrying out support services for
the naval forces, are not entitled to engage in belligerent acts during an IAC,
but they may defend themselves, to include resisting attacks by enemy
forces. 18
A “warship” is defined as
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline. 19

This definition originated during the negotiations of 1907 Hague VII and is
widely accepted as customary international law. 20 Warships do not have to
be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer
and manned by a qualified crew subject to armed forces discipline. 21 Nonetheless, warships maintain their status, even if civilians form part of the crew
if they have been designated as a warship by the flag State. 22 In the United
States, all Navy ships designated “USS” and Coast Guard vessels designated
“USCGC” are considered warships under international law. 23

18. OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 17, art. 12; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK , supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 3.3.3.3;
GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 17, ¶ 1020.
19. Hague VII, supra note 17, arts. 1–4; Convention on the High Seas art. 8, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 29;
A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR: TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS
WITH COMMENTARIES 316–20 (1909); NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, § 500C; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK , supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.4.1.
20. HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 316–20; C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA § 270 (6th ed. 1967).
21. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 17, § 13.4.1.
22. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 17, §§ 4.16.1, 4.16.2.
23. U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Navy Regulations art. 0406 (1990); U.S.
Department of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5030.8c, General Guidance for the Classification
of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures (2016). The U.S. Coast Guard
is considered an armed force of the United States. See 10 U.S.C. § 101; 14 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
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ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS

Enemy merchant vessels can only be attacked if they become a military objective by their conduct or operation. However, even if not engaged in acts
that would allow them to be attacked, 24 they may be captured and (after adjudication) condemned as prizes. 25 Using merchant vessels to actively support military operations during an IAC forfeits their protected status and
intentionally puts civilians in harm’s way. For example, all Chinese-flagged
container ships at sea or in port would be targetable given the inability to
detect whether the ships have a Klub-K battery onboard until the weapon
system is employed.
A. Capture
Enemy merchant vessels may be captured anywhere beyond neutral territory.
If military circumstances do not permit capture and adjudication as an enemy
prize, the merchant vessel may be destroyed after taking all possible
measures to provide for the safety of the passengers and crew. The officers
and crew of a captured enemy merchant ship may be detained as prisoners
of war. 26 However, if the enemy merchant ship did not take part in the hostilities, the officers and crew should not be detained if they “make a formal
promise in writing, not to undertake, while hostilities last, any service connected with the operations of the war.” 27 Enemy merchant vessels may resist
attacks or capture by enemy forces but may not commit hostile acts in offensive combat operations. 28
B. Destruction
As a general rule, as embodied in the London Protocol, international law
prohibits the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel unless the safety of
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, A Handbook on Economic
Warfare (1939), reprinted in SEA POWER AND THE CONTROL OF TRADE: BELLIGERENT
RIGHTS FROM THE RUSSIAN WAR TO THE BEIRA PATROL, 1854–1970, at 445, 465 (Nicholas
Tracy ed., 2005).
26. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.2.1.
27. Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise
of the Right of Capture in Naval War arts. 6, 8, Oct 18, 1907, Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544;
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 4.16.2.
28. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 4.16.1.
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passengers and crew is first assured. 29 During World War II, however, enemy
merchant ships were routinely attacked and sunk by belligerent warships and
submarines without prior warning and without first providing for the safety
of the passengers and crew. Initially, the belligerents justified these attacks
as reprisals. As the war progressed, merchant vessels on both sides were
armed and convoyed by warships, collected intelligence, or were otherwise
incorporated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort and were
therefore regarded as legitimate military objectives. Although the 1936 London Protocol remains valid, it has been interpreted in light of State practice
during and after World War II. An enemy merchant vessel may therefore be
attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior warning if it:
1. Persistently refuses to stop upon being duly summoned to do so;
2. Actively resists visit and search or capture;
3. Sails under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;
4. Is armed with systems or weapons beyond that required for selfdefense against terrorists, piracy, or like threats;
5. Is incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the enemy’s armed forces;
6. Acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy’s
armed forces;
7. Is integrated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort
and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would,
under the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 30
C. Protected Civilian Vessels
Certain classes of enemy vessels are exempt from capture or destruction if
they are innocently employed in their exempt category. These vessels lose
their protected status if they take part in hostilities or hamper the movement
29. Procès-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of
the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, reprinted in 31
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 137 (1939); NWIP 10-2, supra
note 17, § 503b(3); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §§ 8.6.2.1, 8.6.2.2; DOD LAW
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.5.2.
30. NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, § 503b(3); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §
8.6.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.5.2.
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of combatants, refuse to submit to identification and inspection procedures,
or refuse an order to stay out of the area of operations. Civilian passenger
vessels at sea may be captured but are exempt from destruction unless they
are used by the enemy for a military purpose (e.g., transporting troops or
military cargo), resist capture, or refuse to comply with the direction of the
intercepting warship. 31 China has a legal obligation not to take advantage of
the exempt character of a vessel in order to use it for a military purpose while
purportedly preserving its innocent appearance. This obligation would be
violated by using a nondescript RORO ferry as an amphibious assault ship
to support an amphibious landing. Moreover, any RORO ferry operating
outside its normal coastal sea routes or in the area of military operations
would be at risk of being attacked since it would be virtually impossible to
distinguish a militarily enhanced ferry from a normal ferry and would be presumed to be supporting the invasion fleet.
D. Conversion of Merchant Vessels
Merchant vessels can become warships if they are converted into a warship
by the flag State consistent with the rules set out in Hague VII. The Convention requires that converted merchant ships: (1) be placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the State whose flag
it flies, (2) bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of their nationality, (3) be under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the
service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the fighting
fleet, and (4) be manned by a crew subject to military discipline. 32 Once converted into a warship, merchant vessels must comply with the LOAC. 33 Additionally, a belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must,
as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of warships. 34 Once
a merchant vessel is converted and announced in the list of warships, it becomes a valid military objective and may be targeted or captured on sight.
To the extent China places container missile systems on civilian container ships for the purpose of conducting offensive precision strikes during
an IAC, it must first convert and designate the container ship as a warship
consistent with Hague VII. Similarly, to the extent China converts heavy-lift
31. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.3.
32. Hague VII, supra note 17, arts. 1–4.
33. Id. art. 5.
34. Id. art. 6.
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commercial ships and RORO vessels into amphibious assault ships to support combat operations in an IAC, it must first convert and designate the
commercial vessels as warships in accordance with Hague VII.
Whether China will comply with these requirements is questionable, at
best. In the past, Chinese-flagged civilian vessels, which had not been designated warships, were used to conduct offensive belligerent acts in support
of PLAN operations. Following a series of incidents between South Vietnamese warships and Chinese fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of the
Western Paracel Islands (Crescent Group), Chinese forces seized the islands
from South Vietnam on January 20, 1974. The Chinese invasion force was
comprised of a flotilla of PLAN warships and civilian maritime militia fishing
boats, which were used as de facto amphibious assault ships to land PLA
troops on the islands. 35
IV.

PERFIDY (TREACHERY)

International law prohibits the killing or wounding of the enemy by resorting
to perfidy. 36 Perfidy is defined as an act that invites the confidence of the
enemy to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or are obliged to
accord, protection under the LOAC, with intent to betray that confidence. 37
The key element is the false claim to protections under the LOAC to secure
a military advantage over the opponent. 38 An example of perfidy would be
feigning civilian status as a merchant vessel and then engaging the enemy
with a Klub-K missile battery or feigning status as a passenger ferry and then
participating in an amphibious assault.
35. See Ho van Ky-Thoai, Naval Battle of the Paracels, in VOICES FROM THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1967–1975), at 153 (K.W. Taylor ed., 2014); Toshi Yoshihara, The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle, 69 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1, 6–10 (2016); Derek
Grossman & Logan Ma, A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us,
THERANDBLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-ofchinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html.
36. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Annex
to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2295; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, §§ 5.4.2, 5.21, 5.22., 5.22.2.
37. Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 5.22.1.
38. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
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Q-ships are a historical example. During World War I and II, Allied merchant ships, known as Q-ships, were armed to counter Germany’s effective
use of U-boats to interdict allied shipping. 39 They would loiter in sea lanes
or straggle behind allied convoys, inviting U-boats to attack. When hailed, a
portion of the crew would purportedly abandon ship. When the U-boat surfaced to sink the ship, the Q-ships would uncover their concealed weapons,
raise the naval ensign, and open fire on the submarine. 40 Most experts today
would consider that the use of Q-ships is no longer acceptable and would
constitute a perfidious act. 41
V.

CONCLUSION

Generally, enemy civilian vessels shall not be the object of attack. Enemy
merchant vessels may be captured as prizes but should not be attacked outright unless they become a military objective by their conduct or operation.
It is not unlawful to convert merchant vessels into warships or use such vessels as naval auxiliaries so long as China follows the rules, something it has
not shown a propensity to do in other contexts (e.g., use of excessive force
in maritime law enforcement operations; intentional violations of the
COLREGS, UNCLOS, and SOLAS; failure to comply with the International
Health Regulations 42 during the COVID-19 pandemic; etc.). Failure to comply with the law of armed conflict by surreptitiously incorporating merchant
vessels into China’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort endangers civilian seafarers and puts all civilian ships at risk that may be operating in the area of
hostilities.

39. E. KEBLE CHATTERTON, Q-SHIPS AND THEIR STORY: A HISTORY OF DECOY VES(1922).
40. RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY AT SEA: U.S. MERCHANT SHIPS AND AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR I 26–27 (2009); 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II 281–85 (2010).
41. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 186 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995).
42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d
ed. 2005).
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